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I. INTRODUCTION
Discredited by Professor Charles Fairman' in a study with which even
activists concur,- rejected by the Supreme Court,3 the theory that the Bill of
Rights was incorporated in the fourteenth amendment has nine lives. Now
Michael Curtis attempts to revive it,4 making my 22 page confirmation5 of
Fairman's 134 page study his whipping boy. My "historical analysis" alleged-
ly is "so mistaken that it is entitled to little weight." 6 Like his activist fellows
he begins with the results, "horrified" that one should impeach the extension
to the states of free speech and other rights secured by the Bill of Rights
against the federal government.7 So he reasons back from the "right result," 8
a method reminiscent of "the end justifies the means." 9
I. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
Fairman, wrote Alexander Bickel, "conclusively disproved [Justice] Black's contention; at least, such is the
weight of opinion among disinterested observers." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962).
2. Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent"
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 607 (1978). Professor Michael Perry
concurs in my view that "the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights
constitutes an invasion of rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, an invasion of such magnitude
as to demand proof that such was the framers' intention." Perry, Essay Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 690
(1978).
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 25 (1980), holds to the contrary, but "incorporation" is indispensa-
ble to his "theory." See Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981).
3. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947). Professor Thomas Grey commented, the Court "clearly
has declined" to accept "the flimsy historical evidence" profferred by Justice Black, architect of the "incorpora-
tion" theory. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1975).
4. Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Curtis]. Apparently, this is the first sortie into legal commentary
by Curtis, a practitioner in Greensboro, North Carolina.
5. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 134-56 (1977).
6. Curtis, supra note 4, at 47.
7. "Fairman was horrified at the thought that the fourteenth amendment required the states to obey all of
the Bill of Rights." Id. at 49 (emphasis added). Professor Randall Bridwell animadverts upon an "argument
favoring expansive judicial powers ... structured around the horrible results that will allegedly occur without
it." Bridwell, The Federal Judiciary: America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30 S. CAR. L. REV. 467,473 n. 14
(1979). William Trotter wrote, "When ... we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which
there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unneces-
sary,... wicked, we may know that that opinion is a nonrational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon
inadequate evidence." W. TROTTER, INSTINCTS OF THE HERD 44 (1916).
8. Curtis, supra note 4, at 49.
9. Professor Leonard Levy observed that "any means to a justifiable end is, in a democratic society, a
noxious doctrine." L. LEVY, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL VARREN 190 (1972). Lord Chancellor
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:435
He jumps off from William W. "Crosskey's central thesis that the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment was designed to
apply the Bill of Rights to the states,"' 0 and reasons that the key to construc-
tion of the 1866 debates is furnished by "certain unorthodox ideas held by a
number of Republicans"-never mind the vastly preponderant Republican
view to the contrary-the "idea that the States were already required to obey
the Bill of Rights under the privileges and immunities clause of the original
Constitution."" t Curtis considers that "privileges and immunities" is "a
natural way to describe the rights in the Bill of Rights." 12 By whomsoever
uttered, this is arrant nonsense. The 1787 article IV "privileges and immuni-
ties" obviously could not comprehend the as yet unborn Bill of Rights, added
to quiet widespread fears of federal encroachment. 13 Moreover, article IV was
designed to raze trade barriers between the states, to promote "trade and
commerce,"'14 whereas the Bill of Rights was meant to erect barriers against
federal interference with cherished individual rights. One greater than
Crosskey, Chief Justice Marshall, said with respect to the Bill of Rights in
Barron v. Baltimore5 that, "[h]ad Congress engaged in the extraordinary
occupation of improving the constitutions of the several States by affording
the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own
governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have
declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language." ' 6 Describing this as
the "iniquitous doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore," Crosskey asserts that it was
"incorrectly decided,' ''without any warrant at all,"' 7  when in fact
Sankey stated: "It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong .... It is not sufficient to do
justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or improper means." Quoted by Chief Justice Warren in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
10. Curtis, supra note 4, at 45.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 48. It did not seem "natural" to the Supreme Court. Close upon the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, Chief Justice Waite held respecting the first amendment right to assemble:
This ... was not intended to limit the powers of the State government.., but to operate upon the
National government alone.
For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States. The power for
that purpose was originally placed there, and it has never been surrendered to the United States.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)(emphasis added).
13. Curtis concedes that the contrary reading "may well have been incorrect." Curtis, supra note 4. at 86.
A similar attempt by Chief Justice Warren in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), to read the equal protection
of the fourteenth amendment back into the fifth was labelled by Professor Ely as "'gibberish." J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32 (1980).
14. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Independent Warehouses v.
Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 94 (1947), referred to "Ithe unedifying story of colonial rivalry in preying upon commerce,
which more than any one thing made our Federal Constitution a necessity."
15. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
16. Id. at 250.
17. W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OFTHE UNITED STATES 1076,
1091 (1953). In his critique of Fairman, Crosskey stated, "[l1t is elementary that not even 'legislative history'
properly so-called can be employed to contradict and destroy the plain letter of a clear text." Crosskey, Charles
Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1954). The Supreme Court held, however, that "there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory
legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on superficial examination."' Harrison v.
Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476,479 (1943). And it subsequently declared that the plain meaning rule "has not
dominated our decisions. The contrary doctrine has prevailed." Association of Westinghouse Salaried Em-
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Madison's proposal to extend the free speech provision to the States was
rejected by the draftsmen of the Bill of Rights. 8
"Curiously," Curtis writes, "Berger ignores Crosskey's article" and
thus "fails to come to grips with the strongest case which has been made
against his view."' 9 There is nothing "curious" about my disregard. Profes-
sor Julius Goebel wrote that "Crosskey's performance, measured by even the
least exacting of scholarly standards, is ... without merit .... Mr.
Crosskey... coming to his task with a new axe to grind has seemingly for-
sworn all canons of objectivity to make himself a grindstone to suit his pur-
poses.",20 Professors Henry Hart and Ernest Brown were equally unsparing;2 '
and my own microscopic study of the 130 or so pages Crosskey devoted to
judicial review led me to concur with Hart. 22 Hag-ridden by an idge fixe,
Crosskey turned a blind eye to contradictory evidence.
Not surprisingly, Curtis exhibits the same analytical faults as Crosskey.
So, he begins, "[b]y ordinary use of language, the rights set out in the Bill of
Rights are literally privileges or immunities,"23 forgetting that these are legal,
not street terms, fraught with history hereinafter set forth. Next he turns to
Justice Cardozo's statement that "some of the privileges and immuni-
ties ... have been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of
rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorp-
tion.",24 This shows a process of judicial absorption, not a "take-over" by the
framers. Since what is in issue is the constitutional authorization for
Cardozo's "take-over," his statement can hardly justify self-conferred ju-
dicial power. Moreover, much as we revere Cardozo, his "reflection" that
some of the privileges and immunities set out in the Bill of Rights were not
protected against state action 6 cannot be taken as a conclusive identification
of the two (the privileges and immunities of article IV and the Bill of Rights) in
ployees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955). See Wirtz v. Local 133, Bottle Blowers Assn.,
389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968). Judge Learned Hand held that if the purpose is "manifest" it "override[s] even the
explicit words used." Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903).
18. For citations see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134 n.4 (1977). Ely states: "In terms of
the original understanding, Baron was almost certainly decided correctly." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRUST 1% (1980). See also note 12 supra.
19. Curtis, supra note 4, at 50. Fairman reduced Crosskey's "case" to rubble. Fairman, A Reply to
Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 144 (1954).
20. Goebel, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 451 (1954).
21. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954); Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1954).
22. Citations will be found in the index ("Crosskey") of R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME
COURT (1969). For example, Crosskey charged that Daniel Call (the reporter of Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call
5 (Va. 1782)), reporting 45 years after the case was decided, "'was simply manufacturing, in ex-post-facto
manner, a little much needed pre-Constitutional usage" to bolster the theory ofjudicial review. W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 960 (1953). The historical facts disprove the charge. 2 D. MAYS, EDMUND
PENDLETON 196 (1952).
23. Curtis, supra note 4, at 48.
24. Id., quoting Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (emphasis added).
25. As Professor Robert Bork said in a similar situation: '[Those] cases themselves require justification
and cannot be taken to support the principle advanced to support them." Bork, The Impossibility of Finding
Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 698.
26. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937). See Curtis, supra note 4, at 48.
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light of their clearly different provenance and purposes. In a splendid non
sequitur, Curtis concludes:
Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment these privileges and im-
munities had been held to limit the power of the federal government only and not
the states. So one could reasonably conclude from the plain language of the
amendment that it was intended to extend the protection of the Bill of Rights
against the states. 27
Curtis notices that the "absorption" culminating in Cardozo's Palko
opinion was based on the due process clause, which Curtis considers reached
"the right result for the wrong reason."2 8 One hopes that by "wrong reason"
Curtis reflects Hamilton's 1787 summary of 400 years of English and colonial
history: due process applies only to judicial proceedings, never to action by a
legislature 2 9-i.e., it is procedural, not substantive. So Curtis turns to the
"privileges or immunities" of the fourteenth amendment, though aware that
in 1873 the Court deprived it "of any significant meaning," 30 since when it has
lain in death-like torpor.
Curtis taxes me with refusing "to accept Fairman's argument that a
selective incorporation was intended, ' 31 based on Fairman's conclusion,
after "brooding" over the matter, that Cardozo's "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' was about as close as one could come to the 'vague aspira-
tions' which the framers had for the clause.",32 True, I made no reference to
this conclusion. But if the terms "privileges or immunities" are "vague"-
"quite inscrutable," Professor John Hart Ely has it 3-how can they justify an
invasion of the rights reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Such a
purpose, Chief Justice Marshall held, had to be expressed "in plain and
27. Curtis. supra note 4, at 48.
28. Id. at 49. See note 32 infra. After an elaborate survey of the historical materials, Justice Moody
concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination "'was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law,
but . . . a right separate, independent and outside of due process. Congress, in submitting the amendments to
the several States, treated the two rights as exclusive of each other." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110
(1908).
29. 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962); Berger, "Law of the
Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. I (1979).
30. Curtis, supra note 4. at 48, 85.
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. Professor Louis Lusky observed:
"'[O]rdered liberty" is too vague to describe a national objective. It says that order and liberty are both
to be sought, but provides no standard for reconciling the eternal conflict between them.
It is a vehicle for whatever meaning the Court gives it, and thus enables the Court to apply its own
conceptions of public policy ....
L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 105, 107 (1975).
Judge Henry Friendly wrote, "it appears undisputed that the selective incorporation theory" has no
"historical support .... And it does seem extraordinary that a theory going to the very nature of our Constitu-
tion and having such profound effects for all of us should be carrying the day without ever having been
explicated in a majority opinion of the Court .... [T]he present Justices feel that if their predecessors could
arrange for the absorption of some such provisions in the due process clause, they ought to possess similar
absorptive capacity toward other provisions equally important in their eyes." Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 934, 935 (1965).
33. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 98 (1980).
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intelligible language, ' 34 or as Justice Miller held in 1873, "language which
expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
' 35
In fact, the framers of the fourteenth amendment had a clear purpose to
confer limited, enumerated privileges, and I turn to their debates in order to
brush in the background against which to measure Curtis' assertions.
II. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
The terms "privileges" and "immunities" are first met in article IV of
the Articles of Confederation. To promote "intercourse among the people of
the different states in this Union," it provided that they shall be "entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states," specifying
"free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and ... all the privi-
leges of trade and commerce."-3 6 For the founders, the enumerated "privi-
leges of trade and commerce" limited the general words "privileges and
immunities." 37 The phrase "privileges and immunities" was picked up by
article IV of the Constitution, and very early the courts of Maryland and
38Massachusetts construed them in terms of trade and commerce. Next came
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866: "There shall be no discrimination in civil rights
or immunities .. but the inhabitants ... shall have the same right to make
and enforce contracts, to sue .... to hold and convey real and personal
property .. . Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania explained that "to avoid
any misapprehension" as to what the "fundamental rights of citizenship" are,
"they are stated in the bill. The same section goes on to define with particu-
larity the civil rights and immunities which are to be protected by this bill.",40
Thayer adds that "when those civil rights which are first referred to in general
terms are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possi-
34. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
35. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 36, 78 (1872). See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 82 (1949).
36. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1963). The Court drew on the
Articles of Confederation in an analogous situation. "The only allusion to imposts in the Articles of Confedera-
tion is clearly limited to duties on goods imported from foreign States." Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
123, 136 (1869).
37. Madison wrote: "For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and
all others were meant to be included in the preceding general terms? Nothing is more natural or common than
first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 41 at 269 (James Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
38. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89,91 (Mass. 1827).
Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957), in which the Court, per Justice Harlan said, "[[W]e
should not assume that Congress ... used the words 'advocate' and 'teach' in their ordinary dictionary mean-
ings when they had already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation." Curtis
tells us that Giles Hotchkiss of New York "agreed that the first part of the amendment, the privileges and
immunities provision, 'is precisely like the present Constitution [article IV]; it confers no additional powers."'
Curtis, supra note 4, at 74. After stating that the privileges and immunities of article IV and the fourteenth
amendment are "in each one the same," Justice Miller went on to say, "In the article of the Confederation we
have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of civil
rights meant by the phrase." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872).
39. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
40. Id. at 1151.
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bility that the general words which have been used can be extended beyond
the particulars which have been enumerated.", 4' There were other and similar
42
restrictive explanations.
Notwithstanding such assurances, John Bingham, draftsman of the four-
teenth amendment in the very same session, protested that the "civil rights
and immunities" phrase was "oppressive," that it would "embrace every
right that pertains to the citizen" and strike down "every State constitution
which makes a discrimination on account of race or color in any of the civil
rights of the citizen." 43 At his insistence the phrase was deleted, in order, as
James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, explained, to
obviate a "construction going beyond the specific rights named in the sec-
tion," "a latitudinarian construction not intended." 44 Aftr reading from the
several cases, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and draftsman of the bill, stated that "the great fundamental
rights set forth in this bill [are] the right to acquire property, the right to come
and go at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts,
and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very rights set forth in
this bill,", 45 as its text corroborates.
The fourteenth amendment in large part was enacted to prevent a sub-
sequent repeal of the Civil Rights Act;4 they were regarded as "identical."
Charles Fairman wrote that they were treated as "essentially identical." 47 For
example, George Latham of West Virginia stated that the Act "covers exactly
the same ground as this amendment." 4 Henry Raymond said the Congress
41. Id.
42. For citations see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 27-31 (1977).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1291 (1866)(emphasis added).
44. Id. at 1361, 1366. See text accompanying note 163 infra. Justice Stewart encapsulated this history as
follows:
The legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited
category of rights .... [T]he Senate bill did contain a general provision forbidding "discrimination in
civil rights or immunities" preceding the specific enumeration of rights .... Objections were raised in
the legislative debates to the breadth of the rights of racial equality that might be encompassed by a
prohibition so general .... [A]n amendment was accepted [in the House] striking the phrase from the
bill.
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). In United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281,294 (1920), ChiefJustice
White stated:
[T]he Constitution plainly intended to preserve and enforce the limitations as to discrimination im-
posed upon the States by Article IV of the Articles of Confederation .... The text of Article IV, § 2 of
the Constitution makes manifest that it was drawn with reference to the corresponding clause of the
Article of Confederation and was intended to perpetuate its limitations.
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866)(emphasis added).
46. See text accompanying note 175 infra. See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 23 n. 12
(1977). for additional citations. Curtis misstates my position: "[Berger suggests] that the fourteenth amendment
was drafted only to cure lack of congressional power to pass the Civil Rights Bill .... Curtis, supra note 4, at
97 (emphasis added). That was one ground; the other was to safeguard the Act against repeal by a subsequent
Congress. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 23 n. 12 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 173-75
infra.
47. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
48. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2883 (1866). Thayer "approved of" Bingham's proposed amend-
ment "in which he offers to put this protection [enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill] substantially into the
Constitution." Id. at 1153.
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proposed the Civil Rights Bill "to exercise precisely the powers which the
[Bingham] amendment was intended to confer." 49 Harry Flack, a devotee of a
broad construction of the amendment, wrote, "nearly all said it was but an
incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill .... there was no controversy as to its
purpose and meaning";50 I found no contradictory remarks in the records.
Flack was echoed by others.5 In Reiche v. Smythe,52 the Court held that if
two acts are in pari materia "it will be presumed that if the same word be used
in both, and a special meaning were given in the first act, that it was intended
it should receive the same interpretation in the latter act, in the absence of
anything to show a contrary intention.01
That the particularization of the Act was incorporated in the "privileges
or immunities clause" was the holding of Justice Bradley in 1870: "[T]he civil
rights bill was enacted at the same session, and but shortly before the presen-
tation of the fourteenth amendment .... [It] was in pari materia; and was
probably intended to reach the same object .... [T]he first section of the bill
covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment.- 54 What Bradley
thought "probable" was in fact the framers' view that Act and amendment
were identical. Led by Justice Field, the four dissenters in the Slaughter-
House Cases asked, "What then are the privileges and immunities which are
secured against abridgement by the States?" 56 They answered, "[Iln the first
section of the Civil Rights Act Congress has given its interpretation to these
terms ... [including] the right 'to make and enforce contracts [etc.].'" 57 Al-
though the majority of the Court took an even narrower view of the clause,
concluding that it referred only to the privileges and immunities of a citizen of
the United States as distinguished from those of a state citizen, it yet stated in
comparing article IV and the fourteenth amendment that "[t]here can be but
little question that ... the privileges and immunities intended are the same in
each [case]." 5 8 This history, to my mind, is so clear as to leave no room for
49. Id. at 2802.
50. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908).
51. Howard Jay Graham, an ardent activist, wrote that "[v]irtually every speaker in the debates on the
Fourteenth Amendment-Republican and Democrat alike-said or agreed that the Amendment was designed
to embody or incorporate the Civil Rights Act." H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 291 n.73 (1968).
For similar remarks by Alexander Bickel, Jacobus tenBroek, and Benjamin Kendrick, see R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 23 n.13 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 173-76 infra. Against such
facts compare Curtis' statement that "'Berger attempts to tie the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Civil Rights Bill and to establish their complete identity," Curtis, supra note 4, at
87 (emphasis added), ignoring the unanimous view that they were identical.
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162 (1871).
53. Id. at 165. In 1871 Charles Willard of Vermont said of the first section of the Civil Rights Act: "'This
section, it should be remembered, was enacted by the same Congress which recommended the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, and is, therefore, the best possible statement of what that amendment was intended to
secure .... . CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., App. 189 (1871).
54. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655
(C.C.D. La. 1870)(No. 8,408).
55. 83 U.S. (16 Vall.) 36 (1872).
56. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 75.
1981]
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the view that the "privileges or immunities" clause is "vague" or "inscrut-
able."
Curtis assails this account because "some of Berger's own quotations
refute his view. He quotes Trumblll, the bill's sponsor, as saying: '[C]itizens
of the United States' have 'fundamental rights' . . . such as the rights enu-
merated in this bill." 59 This was a compressed restatement of Trumbull's
earlier explanation, when commenting on the privileges and immunities of
article IV. After summarizing the Maryland and Massachusetts decisions,
which Curtis ignores, and the 1827 case of Corfield v. Coryell, Trumbull said
of the latter decision on circuit by Justice Bushrod Washington:
[H]e enumerates the very rights... which are set forth in the first section of this
bill . . . . This judge goesfirther than the bill under consideration .... The great
fundamental rights set forth in this bill: the right to acquire property, the right to go
and come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts,
and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very rights that are set forth
in this bill . . .6
The particularized "great fundamental rights" leave no crevices into which
still other rights may be poured; a broader construction is foreclosed by
Martin Thayer's flat assertion that the enumerated particulars preclude exten-
sion "beyond the particulars which have been enumerated.", 6' Against this
specific and limited enumeration, it is idle to dwell on Washington's rambling
1827 "dictum," which conferred the right to vote on out-of-state transients
while denying them the right to dredge for oysters. 62 It remains to be said that
in 1871 Trumbull explained that the "privileges or immunities" clause is "a
repetition of a provision [article IV] as it before existed .... The protection
which the Government affords to American citizens under the Constitution as
it was originally formed is precisely the protection it affords to American
citizens under the Constitution as it now exists. The fourteenth amendment
has not extended the rights and privileges of citizens one iota."' 63 Article IV, it
bears reemphasis, did not of course comprehend the as yet unborn Bill of
Rights. As the draftsman of the antecedent "civil rights and immunities" in
the Civil Rights Bill and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee who
59. Curtis, supra note 4, at 86-87.
60. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474-75 (1866)(emphasis added). The reason, as Senator Timothy
Howe of Wisconsin, a "pronounced radical," 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1297 (1971), emphasized, was that the South denied "the plainest and most necessary rights of
citizenship. The right to hold land .... the right to collect their wages by the processes of law when they had
earned their wages [this shed light on what the framers had in mind by "due process"], the right to appear in the
courts, as suitors for every wrong done them .... " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess., S. App. 219 (1866).
61. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
62. For a detailed analysis of Corfield, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 34, 35 (1977).
Notwithstanding the confining Trumbull and Thayer explanations, Curtis prefers to rely on the 1827 Corfield
dictum, saying, "The reference to specific rights includes the following sentence not quoted by Berger: 'These.
and many, other rights which might be mentioned, [including the right to vote specifically rejected by Trumbull]
are strictly speaking, privileges and immunities."' Curtis, supra note 4, at 87. When Corfield was cited in 1871,
Charles Willard observed, "There is, however, a far higher and better authority for a definition of the rights
which belong to a citizen of the United States in the first section of the 'civil rights bill."' CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 189 (1871).
63. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871)(emphasis added).
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explained its meaning in unequivocal terms, Trumbull's views carry great
weight, and as will appear, they were before long unmistakably confirmed.
Despite the foregoing evidence, Curtis refers to "Berger's premise, that a
narrow understanding of the intent of the framers must set the maximum, not
the minimum, scope of constitutional rights," 64 oblivious to Thayer's empha-
sis that the enumerated particulars preclude an extension "beyond the par-
ticulars which have been enumerated.,
65
III. CURTIS' AUTHORITIES
A. Republican Ideas
Curtis' strange theories of construction alone should suffice to shed
doubt on his conclusions: The "fourteenth amendment can be best under-
stood in light of certain unorthodox constitutional ideas held by a number of
Republicans." 66 "Prior to the Civil War afew anti-slavery lawyers and other
leaders developed some remarkable constitutional theories" which "are help-
ful in understanding the 'intent' of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment." 67 The "process by which these ideas filtered from a relatively small
group of anti-slavery activists to a much larger group of Republican politicians
has never been fully explored. By 1866, however, modifications of these ideas
were held by a number of Republican congressmen." 68 Let that be assumed
and such pre-war abolitionism is yet not the test of "intent" of the 39th
Congress. That is to be measured by what was said and happened in that
Congress.
The fact is, as will appear, that the small group of radical dissentients
exercised precious little influence on the framers. 69 Curtis seems incapable of
weighing evidence, of appreciating that in evaluating legislative history, a
great preponderance outweighs opposition remarks to the contrary. Thus, he
charges Berger with failing "to abide by standards which he sets for interpre-
tation of the intentions of the framers of the constitutional provision," e.g.,
that a commentator must not ignore "an influential body of contrary opin-
ion," whereas "statements by opponents cannot be relied on as indicative of
legislative intent." 70 Curtis overlooks Supreme Court holdings that opposition
64. Curtis, supra note 4, at 47. See Kelly's comment on Wilson in note 81 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
66. Curtis, supra note 4. at 45 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). Curtis notes that "[t]hese ideas were not in accordance with accepted
Supreme Court doctrine." Id. at 55.
69. While the amendment was up for ratification, Senator John Sherman told a Cincinnati audience in
September. 1866, that "we defeated every radical proposition in it." J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 167 (1956). Professor James states that it was a "rather consistent practice ... to
disavow Radical influence in the framing of the congressional proposal." Id. An activist apologist, Alfred Kelly,
conceded that "the commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant that the radical Negro reform
program could be only a very limited one." More fully quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 242
(1977).
70. Curtis, supra note 4. at 47 n.lO.
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statements are not evidence of the intent of the framers, for which we must
look to committee reports, statements by committee members and other
proponents of the enactment. 7' Commentators may have "contrary opin-
ions," for example, of whether dissentients were in fact in the minority, but
that cannot convert minority views into evidence of intent. Of the same order
is Curtis' citations of opposition in 1859 by "Bingham, together with a number
of his fellow Republicans," to the admission of Oregon because its Constitu-
tion barred Negroes from entry into the State,72 ignoring that Oregon was
admitted over their objections.73 Then, too, the fire that burned in Bingham in
1859 had been dampened by July, 1866, when he led the fight for readmission
of Tennessee notwithstanding its failure to provide for Negro enfranchise-
ment. He prevailed over his radical brethren by a vote of 125 to 12,74 intoning
"We are all for equal and exact justice ... [but] justice for all is not to be
secured in a day." 75 Presumably, he sniffed what was in the wind, for in April,
1867, his own Ohio state overwhelmed a Negro suffrage amendment by a
plurality of 40,000!76
Again, Curtis cites some glowing references to due process in pre-Civil
War Republican platforms, but concedes that "[i]t is more difficult to show
that Republicans read the original privileges and immunities clause to require
the states to obey the Bill of Rights." 77 By way of exploring the issue he refers
to a Bingham 1856 speech anent a Kansas territorial act:
Kansas was a federal territory. Bingham had no question that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights applied to it. Because the legislation criticized by Bingham was
identical to that passed by a number of states, however, his comments also indi-
cate how well he thought the states were protecting the basic liberties of their
citizens. 78
Recognition that the Bill of Rights applied to a federal territory does not
facilitate incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the "privileges and immunities"
clause, especially since Bingham objected in 1866 to "civil rights" as "op-
pressive" and an invasion of states' rights. 79 Curtis also summons an 1859
71. "'An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority." Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). Remarks made "other than by persons responsible for the preparation or the
drafting of the bill are entitled to little weight .... This is especially so with regard to statements of legislative
opponents. ... Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1976).
72. Curtis, supra note 4, at 58-60.
73. The Oregon Constitution of 1857, which contained a provision barring Negro immigration, article
XVIII, Sec. 4(5), was approved by the Act of February 14, 1859. Its preamble recited "Whereas the people of
Oregon have framed, ratified, and adopted a constitution of State government which is republican in form, and
in conformity with the Constitution of the United States and have applied for admission into the Union ....
W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 219, 221 (1979).
74. For details see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 56, 79, 95 (1977).
75. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3979 (1866). Negro suffrage had to wait for the fifteenth amend-
ment because "in 1866, Republican leaders thought that would not be practical politics." 6 C. FAIRMAN.
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1262 (1971).
76. Woodward, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RE-
CONSTRUCTION 125, 137 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
77. Curtis, supra note 4, at 57.
78. Id.
79. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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James Wilson utterance condemning Southern denials of free speech and
press. 80 But these were conspicuously absent from his summation in 1866 of
the goals of the Civil Rights Bill: "I understand civil rights to be simply the
absolute rights of individuals-such as 'The right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property!' , 8' This
was the exclusive focus of the framers, who particularized and enumerated
the protection to be offered these rights by the bill, making no provision
whatsoever for free speech and the like. 8 "
B. Abolitionist Influence
At the heart of Curtis' analysis lies the erroneous assumption that the
pre-war, anti-slavery zeal was equally influential in shaping the post-war
enactments. Hence, he indicts my "faulty reading of history. Berger mis-
takenly concludes that Republicans in 1866 were hostile to abolitionist ideas-
a puzzling conclusion since the abolition of slavery was the great achievement
of the Republican party." 3 Curtis does not understand that the pre-Civil War
speeches in the drive to abolish slavery no longer reflected the post-war
feelings of the North.68 William Lloyd Garrison, the indomitable abolitionist,
''accurately sensed the new mood when he declared that antislavery societies
served no useful purpose now that slavery was abolished and closed down the
Liberator."85 And he "came out against the forcing of Negro suffrage upon
the South.", 86 The eradication of inequality, C. Vann Woodward observed,
required a "revolution in the North," 87 a revolution for which most Republi-
cans were unprepared. Least of all were they prepared to go beyond prohibi-
tion of discrimination with respect to the enumerated rights to a surrender of
state control over internal affairs in the absence of discrimination, an inex-
plicable shift of goals. The prevailing congressional mood was voiced by
80. Curtis, supra note 4, at 61.
81. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1117 (1866). Consider, too, Wilson's assurance that the Civil
Rights Bill did not comprehend school desegregation or service on juries. Id. Alfred Kelly stated that Wilson
"declared for a narrow interpretation of the measure in unequivocal terms." Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1956). For a more detailed discussion
of Wilson's views, see text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
82. See text accompanying notes 158-63, 166-67 infra (remarks of Lawrence and Thayer).
83. Curtis, supra note 4, at 100. "Whereas the Thirteenth Amendment had been generally popular among
Northerners, the Civil Rights Bill [of 1866], as James G. Blaine recalled, was legislation 'of a different type,'
which particularly in the Middle and Western States, touched upon deep feelings." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1168 (1971). The suggestion that Negroes should be treated as
equals of white men woke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the American mind. D. DONALD, CHARLES
SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 202, 252 (1970).
84. Fear that the emancipated slaves would flock North in droves and compete with white labor alarmed
the North. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 12 (1977). The letters and diaries of Union soldiers,
Woodward notes, reveal an "enormous amount of antipathy towards Negroes." Id. "Racism, David Donald
remarked, 'ran deep in the North,' and the suggestion that 'Negroes should be treated as equals to white men
woke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the American mind."' Id. A campaign for political and social
equality, Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin confessed, was "frightening" to the Republicans who "repre-
sented States containing the despised and feared negroes." Id. at 15.
85. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 233 (1970).
86. F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 230-31 (1959).
87. C. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 79 (1960).
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James Patterson of New Hampshire in a discussion of the fourteenth amend-
ment, for which he voted. "I am opposed," he said, "to any law discriminat-
ing against them [blacks] in the security and protection of life, liberty, person,
property, and the proceeds of their labor .... Beyond this I am not prepared
to go . . . . ,88
Curtis' emphasis on abolitionist influence, on "anti-slavery activists," 9
loses sight of anti-abolitionist feeling in the North and in the 39th Congress.
Professor C. Vann Woodward noted that during the war years "[tihe great
majority of citizens in the North still abhorred any association with abolition-
ists . . . ,"90 scarcely fertile soil for the sowing of abolitionist ideology.
Senator William Fessenden, chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, and Senator James Grimes of Iowa held "the extreme radicals" in "ab-
horrence." 9' Senator Edward Cowan of Pennsylvania ridiculed the notion
that the "antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies, that is inborn, down at
the very foundation of our natures," is "to be swept away by half-a-dozen
debates and the reading of half-a-dozen reports from certain abolitionist so-
cieties." 92 Thaddeus Stevens, the radical leader, was "hated" by many Re-
publicans. In the Joint Committee "[h]is own measures were more voted
against than voted for." 93 His Senate counterpart, Charles Sumner, was "dis-
trust[ed]" when not "detested." 94 Trumbull scathingly commented in 1870
that "it has been over the idiosyncracies, over the unreasonable propositions,
over the impracticable measures of... [Sumner] that freedom has been pro-
claimed and established." 95
The fact is, as Professor Michael L. Benedict has shown, that a Republi-
can conservative-moderate coalition "enacted their program with the sullen
acquiescence of some radicals and over the open opposition of many." 96 This
is disingenuously rendered by Curtis as "Berger argues that a Republican
centrist-conservative coalition was in control of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
and that abolitionist ideas were anathema to these men." 97 Let Curtis quarrel
with Benedict, who researched the details, and who is in accord with Pro-
fessor David Donald.98 And Benedict is confirmed by the defeat by a vote of
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866). For similar remarks see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY 125-26, 170 (1977).
89. Curtis, supra note 4, at 51, 53-55.
90. C. vOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 73 (1960).
91. B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OFTHE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 257 (1914).
92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 343, 344-45 (1866). Howard Jay Graham, an activist, wrote, "the
early anti-slavery usage and the racial-humanitarian expansion and coverage before the Civil War had got
forgotten and eclipsed during Reconstruction." H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 264 (1968).
93. F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 259, 268 (1959).
94. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 248 (1970).
95. M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 39 (1974).
96. Id. at 210.
97. Curtis, supra note 4, at 79-80 (emphasis added). Chairman Fessenden "was unwilling to allow the
process of reconstruction to be controlled by the radicals." B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COM-
MITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 174 (1914).
98. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 237 (1977). Curtis argues, "'The fact that radicals and
moderate Republicans were divided over black suffrage does not prove any similar division existed over the Bill
of Rights." Curtis, supra note 4, at 93. Yet Charles Sumner stated during the debate on the fifteenth amendment
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125 to 12 in the House and 34 to 4 in the Senate of radical insistence that
Tennessee provide for Negro suffrage, 99 and this after the submission of the
fourteenth amendment to the ratifiers. It is such lopsided votes, not what
abolitionists had said outside the halls of Congress, that establish the framers'
intent.
Notwithstanding the detailed evidence of anti-abolitionist sentiment in
the 39th Congress, Curtis states, "According to Berger, not only were these
Congressmen hostile to abolitionist ideas, they were influenced by 'Negro-
phobia.'""00 This was "according" to George Julian of Indiana (and others),
who lamented in the House, "[T]he real trouble is that we hate the Negro";'O
and "according" to the radical Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Wilson,
who stated in the Senate in January, 1869, "There is not today a square mile
in the United States where the advocacy of the equal rights and privileges of
these colored men has not been in the past and is not now unpopular."' 02 In
his study of the fifteenth amendment, Professor William Gillette observed that
Congressmen ran the risk of "drowning by swimming against the treacherous
current of racial prejudice and opposition to Negro suffrage."' 0 3 "Still,"
Curtis ironically remarks, "they were willing to invade states' rights, as con-
ventionally understood, to protect blacks whom they supposedly disliked. "'04
Having freed the slaves at the cost of a bitter war, the North was not minded
to permit the South to reduce them once more to serfdom through the medium
of the Black Codes, to expose them to "damnable violence," "wrong and
outrage," "fiendish oppression," "barbarous cruelties."' 0 5 As William
Lawrence, who reiterated that blacks were entitled to personal security,
personal liberty, and the right to acquire property, declared, "It is idle to say
that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor
whereby alone he can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a
right to live, and yet to deny him the right to make a contract to secure the
privileges and rewards of labor." "These," he said, were the "necessary
incidents of these absolute rights." 0 The aim of the framers was to secure
this narrow enclave of rights in order to ensure the right to exist free, to
that "if the clause [Fourteenth] is inadequate to protect persons in their... right to vote, it is inadequate to
protect them in anything." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869). Wilson assured the framers that
school segregation was untouched by the Civil Rights Bill. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866).
See Senator Sherman's remark in note 69 supra. Efforts to bar all discriminations were repeatedly rejected. R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 163-64 (1977). See text accompanying note 115-16 infra.
99. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 59-60, 79, 95 (1977). Sumner's proposal "that all persons
were 'equal before the law, whether in the court room or at the ballot-box' received 8 yeas to 39 nays." 6 C.
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1264 (1971).
100. Curtis, supra note 4, at 80 (emphasis added).
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1866). For similar statements see R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 13 (1977). See also text accompanying note 97 supra.
102. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869).
103. W. GILLETITE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 25 (1965).
104. Curtis, supra note 4, at 80. This profound insight is repeated in Curtis' conclusion. Id. at 100.
105. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 25-26 (1977).
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866).
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prevent oppression, no more, as the unmistakable denial of suffrage'07 alone
should demonstrate. Repeatedly, attempts to abolish all discriminations were
rejected.'08 At the outset, Stevens submitted to the Joint Committee a pro-
posal that "all laws, state and federal, shall operate impartially and equally on
all persons . . . ." But in summing up in favor of the fourteenth amendment,
he sadly confessed that while he had hoped to remodel "all our institutions as
to have them freed from every vestige of ... inequality of rights . . . , that no
distinction would be tolerated .... [t]his bright dream has vanished."'O The
Committee Chairman, Senator Fessenden, explained that "[w]e cannot put
into the Constitution ... an entire exclusion of all class distinctions." "0 It is
characteristic of Curtis' one-sided analysis that he should ignore such state-
ments, which are part of the legislative history of the amendment, and cite
instead Fessenden's 1859 opposition to the admission of Oregon,"' which his
fellows overruled.
Curtis is taken in by and pins his case to Bingham's "citizens of the
United States." So he states:
The debates show, however, that Bingham and other framers of the fourteenth
amendment relied on a reading of the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV, section 2, by which it protected a body of national privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, including those in the Bill of Rights. This reading
may well have been incorrect. It does not matter, however, because in redrafting
Bingham's first proposal, the amendment was rewritten to secure privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the United States from state abridgment. 12
That revision had nothing at all to do with broadening the scope of privileges
and immunities. Although the Negro had been emancipated, the Dred Scott
decision threw a shadow over his citizenship; the matter was a source of
interminable controversy. So the freedman were made "citizens of the United
States" by the Civil Rights Bill because, as Senator Trumbull explained, he
wished "to end that very controversy, whether the negro is a citizen or
107. Lusky, Essay Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979), refers to "Justice Harlan's irrefut-
able and unrefuted demonstrations in dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the
right to vote." See also Abraham, Essay Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467,468 (1979); Mendelson, Essay
Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 452-53 (1979); Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional
Change: Another Look at the "'Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 603, 606-07 (1978); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978).
108. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 163-64 (1977).
109. B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1914);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3148 (1866) (emphasis added).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866). See also statement of William Windom of Minne-
sota, id. at 1159; statement of James Patterson in text accompanying note 88 supra. In an analogous situation the
Court, per Justice Douglas, stated, "The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable
for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we
cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 191 (1961). By the same token, the words "equal protection" cannot embrace all discriminations. The
Court itself held that "[i]t is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,33 (1973).
111. Curtis, supra note 4, at 60.
112. Id. at 86. That was not the view of the Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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not." 3 Very late in the consideration of the amendment, Senator Howard
proposed the same formula, making one born in the United States a citizen
thereof, stating that this "settles the great question of citizenship and removes
all doubts as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States." "14
Justice Miller likewise referred to Dred Scott and said, "To remove this
difficulty primarily ... the first clause of the first section was framed ....
That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit
of no doubt." "5 Patently, settlement of who is entitled to the protection of the
amendment sheds little light on what rights he is being granted."16 Through-
out, Curtis is hampered by his inability to grasp such distinctions."
7
C. John Bingham
Curtis relies on John Bingham, draftsman of the fourteenth amendment,
to demonstrate that it "was designed to make the Bill of Rights enforceable as
a limit on the states," and considers that "Bingham's remarks are a serious
problem for Berger's interpretation. To meet this problem Berger sets out to
prove that Bingham was a legal moron."" 8 Such gross exaggerations vitiate
Curtis' credibility. Bingham, I stated, "was a muddled thinker, given to the
florid, windy rhetoric of a stump orator, liberally interspersed with invoca-
tions to the Deity, not to the careful articulation of a lawyer who addresses
himself to great issues."" 9 That view was shared by Charles Fairman and
Alexander Bickel. Fairman labelled Bingham "an ardent rhetorician, not a
man of exact knowledge or clear conception or accurate language. "' 20 Bickel
charitably stated that Bingham was "not normally distinguished for precision
of thought and statement." ' 2 Since Bingham is the linchpin of Curtis' argu-
ment, it needs to be shown that his colleagues could not have relied on his
confused misstatements.
His draft provided for "equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and
property"' and he stated that it "stands in the very words of the Constitu-
tion," that "[e]very word of the proposed amendment is today in the Consti-
tution,... exactly in the language of the Constitution."' 1 2 But the words
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1285 (1866). For similar remarks see R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 44 (1977). See also text accompanying note 144 infra.
114. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
115. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1972). See text accompanying note 144 infra.
116. Compare text accompanying note 63 supra.
117. Thus, to prove a claim for protection against state interference, Curtis lumps with his pre-War
references to guarantees of free speech a "bill to prohibit postmasters from mailing any publication 'touching on
the subject of slavery," ' which Daniel Webster opposed because "it violated the first and fourth amendments."
Curtis, supra note 4, at 54. A postmaster unquestionably fell within the coverage of the Bill of Rights, for that
applied to the federal government. See also text accompanying note 78 supra (Curtis' treatment of the territory
of Kansas).
118. Curtis, supra note 4, at 88.
119. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 145 (1977).
120. 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 462 (1971).
121. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. I, 25 (1955).
Bingham "used ringing rhetoric as a substitute for rational analysis." Mendelson, Mr. Justice Black's Four-
teenth Amendment, 53 MINN. L. REV. 711, 716 (1969).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1034, 1095 (1866).
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"equal protection" were not in the Constitution, and such glaring in-
exactitude impeaches his testimony. Bingham was unable to discriminate, to
understand what he read. He translated the provision of article IV that "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States" as "the provisions in the bill of rights that
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States ... . '23 The Bill of Rights contains no
privileges and immunities provision; that is found in article IV. Nor did his
fellows confuse the rights of citizens of a state with those of a citizen of the
United States. They expressly distinguished between the two in the four-
teenth amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States ... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." Manifestly we cannot attribute to the framers Bingham's obliteration
of a distinction which they deliberately maintained.
Bingham veered as crazily as a rudderless ship.' 24 On February 26th,
1866, he read the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and stressed that
his own proposed "amendment does not impose upon any State... any
obligation which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the
Constitution." 125 On February 28th he said,
I repel the suggestion.., that the committee... seek[s] in any form to... take
away from any State any right that belongs to it .... The proposition ... is
simply ... to arm the Congress ... with the power to enforce the bill of rights as
it stands in the Constitution today. It "hath that extent-no more.',126
Thereby he implied that the Bill of Rights already bound the states, that only a
power of enforcement was lacking. Then he quoted Barron v. Baltimore to the
effect that the fifth amendment is not "applicable to the States," and asserted
that "although as ruled the existing amendments are not applicable to and do
not bind the States, they are nevertheless to be enforced and observed in the
States by the grand utterance of that immortal man,"' 27 Daniel Webster,
whose quoted words have nothing to do with the case. Are we to conclude
that the framers exalted a Webster generality over a holding by Chief Justice
Marshall?
123. Id. at 1089, 1095 (emphasis added). Fairman cites a number of other instances where Bingham was
"badly mistaken," among them, "Bingham was deep in error in treating Barron v. Baltimore as a 'decision
showing that the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United States the bill of
rights ... had been denied.' What the Court actually held was 'that the provision in the fifth amendment... is
intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not
applicable to legislation of the States .... " 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1289 n.263 (1971).
124. My remarks about Bingham are misrepresented by Curtis; "It is a mark of the weakness of Berger's
analysis that he is forced to rely repeatedly on, the hypothesis that the framers did not know what they were
doing." Curtis, supra note 4. at 98 (emphasis added). The passages he cites deal with Bingham alone.
125. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1034 (1866).
126. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1089-90. Curtis tells us that "Bingham wrote this version of the amendment on the assumption
that his constitutional theories and those of a number of his colleagues, not the decisions of the Supreme Court.
were the law of the land." Curtis, supra note 4, at 66.
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On March 9th Bingham noted that "the bill of rights, as has been sol-
emnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States, does not limit the
power of the States .... " and that
the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen ... is in the States,
and not in the federal government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect
in the Constitution of the country. I have advocated here an amendment which
would arm Congress with the power to... punish all violations by State officers
of the bill of rights.'28
If the care of these rights "is in the States," how do state officers violate the
Bill of Rights, which admittedly "does not limit the power of the States?"
How can his statements be reconciled with the tremendous turnover of con-
trol of state criminal administration, of pornography and the like that in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights entails? Recall his objection that the "civil
rights and immunities" of the Civil Rights Bill was "oppressive," that it
would strike down "every State constitution which makes a discrimination on
account of race and color in any of the civil rights of the citizen,"' 29 and ask
how the framers could account for Bingham's inclusion of the Bill of Rights in
the "privileges or immunities" clause.
His remarks are rife with contradiction: "I do not admit. . . that any
State has a right to disfranchise any portion of the citizens of the United
States";'30 but later he stated "we all agree ... that the exercise of the elec-
tive franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is
exclusively under the control of the States." '' If the franchise is a privilege of
"a citizen of the Republic" it cannot be "exclusively under the control of the
States." After the submission of the amendment to the ratifiers, he led the
fight for readmission of Tennessee despite radical objections that its constitu-
tion excluded suffrage for Negroes. 3 2 Such is the evidence that Curtis dis-
misses as "supposed 'contradictions.' '
133
In truth, as Professor Stanley Morrison, concurring with Fairman, stated,
Bingham's "many statements ... are so confused and conflicting as to be of
little weight." 134 This goes beyond the issue of credibility, which courts test
by inconsistent statements. It poses the question: upon which of his conflict-
ing explanations did the framers rely? Legislative history cannot be erected
128. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1292 (1866).
129. See text accompanying note 43 supra. The North would stare uncomprehendingly at an unlimited
catalog of rights that would be applicable to it, for as Senator Howe stated, -[N]o abridgment of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States was tolerated in any of the States represented in Congress."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. Ist Sess., S. App. 219 (1866). See note 226 infra (statement of Trumbull).
130. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess., App. 57 (1866).
131. Id. at 2542.
132. For details see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 56, 79, 95 (1977).
133. Curtis, supra note 4, at 89. For yet other Bingham "contradictions," see text accompanying notes
202-12 infra.
134. Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 161
(1949). Fairman concludes: "When one studies Bingham carefully one learns that many of his utterances cannot
be accepted as serious propositions." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED,
STATES 1289 (1971).
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on such shifting sands. Against this, balance the chorus of agreement as to the
fact that the Civil Rights Act and Amendment were "identical,"'" that the
Act enumerated a narrow group of rights securing the "person and property"
of the freedmen, with no reference whatever to the Bill of Rights or any one of
its amendments, which enumeration, Thayer unequivocally assured the fram-
ers, was exclusive.
13 6
To discredit my evidence of Bingham's contradictions, Curtis first states
that "Bingham's reputation as a lawyer was excellent." ' 37 A lawyer who is
forced to invoke evidence of good reputation confesses that his defense on the
merits is inadequate. Next he points to my own alleged contradictions:
At times Professor Berger views the first version of Bingham's amend-
ment.., as a prototype of the amendment finally adopted. When the Bill of
Rights is concerned, however, Berger's "prototype" becomes simply a rejected
proposal.
The truth, of course, is that the language of the "second" proposal was more
effectively designed to make the Bill of Rights limit the states than the prototype.
The second version was an explicit limitation on the states and specifically secured
all privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment by
a state. 138
"The truth" is that Curtis utterly misreads the record. Bingham's "proto-
type," i.e., the primitive original, provided that "[t]he Congress shall have
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities . . . . " 9 This met sharp
opposition because, as Giles Hotchkiss of New York explained, though he
was ready "to provide that no State shall discriminate between its citizens,"
he was "unwilling" to "authorize Congress to establish uniform laws
throughout the United States ... [for] the protection of life, liberty and prop-
erty." 140 His New York colleague, Judge Robert Hale, objected that this "is
not a mere provision that when the States undertake to give protection which
is unequal Congress may equalize it; it is a grant of power ... to legislate for
the protection of life, liberty and property . ,,14, Henry Raymond, an
influential New York Republican who voted for the fourteenth amendment,
summed up: the Bingham prototype, "encountering considerable opposi-
tion . . . .was finally postponed," 42 and never resuscitated. Notwithstanding
this forthright rejection of congressional authority to legislate for the protec-
tion of life, liberty, and property-the subject of the fifth amendment-Curtis
would extract a general purpose to surrender state control of the broad spec-
135. See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra and notes 173-78 infra.
136. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
137. Curtis, supra note 4, at 88-89.
138. Id. at 90.
139. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 813, 1034 (1866).
140. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added). Foradditional citations, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENTBY JUDICIARY
186 (1977). Curtis acknowledges that "'Bingham was here defending himself against the charge that his legislation
was designed to allow Congress to take over all subjects of state legislation." Curtis, supra note 4, at 90.
141. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1063-64 (1866).
142. Id. at 2502.
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trum of local administration by making the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. This is the more incredible because the framers' purpose was to pre-
vent discrimination with respect to certain privileges, not, as we have seen, to
enlarge federal power across the board, whether there was discrimination or
not.
43
Curtis notes that "a number of Republicans ... rejected Dred Scott and
instead believed that all free persons born in the United States were citizens
of the United States." So "they explicitly wrote national citizenship ... into
the fourteenth amendment. Some believed ... that states could not deprive
persons of due process." So "they wrote this limitation into the fourteenth
amendment."' 44 Aware that an express enumeration excludes unmentioned
particulars, 45 why did they not "explicitly" write the Bill of Rights into the
amendment? As late as 1868 the Republican platform contented itself with
seeking suffrage in the South while "handing Negro suffrage in the North over
to the northern states."'46 Are we to conclude that the northern states, though
unwilling to give the federal government control of suffrage were ready to
surrender control of all matters comprehended by the Bill of Rights, which
applied to their own white population?' 47
D. Wilson, Lawrence, and Thayer
Curtis also summons James Wilson to his aid, citing him for reliance on
the "guarantees of the Bill of Rights, which Wilson considered binding on the
states under the privileges and immunities clause.'"48 As Curtis notes, Wilson
spoke to Bingham's opposition to the Civil Rights Bill, based in part on lack of
power. Commenting on Bingham's proposed amendment, Wilson referred to
the due process-life, liberty, and property-clause in the Bill of Rights and
stated, "[T]hese constitute the civil rights.., and these are the rights to
which this bill relates."'' 49 All unheeding of Wilson's explanations, Curtis
cites Wilson's reference to "the great fundamental rights embraced in the bill
of rights" but does not ask what were these "fundamental rights"? 50 Citing
Kent, Wilson said:
I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as
"The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to
acquire and enjoy property." . . . [T]hese are the rights which this bill proposes to
143. William Lawrence of Ohio said the Civil Rights Bill "does not confer any civil right"; it "does provide
that as to certain enumerated civil rights" whatever "may be enjoyed by any shall be shared by all." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). See note 226 infra.
144. Curtis, supra note 4, at 97.
145. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
146. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 37 (1%5).
147. Alfred Kelly, a perfervid activist, wrote that "the commitment to traditional state-federal relations
meant that the radical Negro reform program could be only a very limited one." Kelly, Comment on HaroldM.
Hyntat's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 40, 55 (H. Hyman ed. 1966).
148. Curtis, supra note 4, at 77.
149. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
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protect .. . . If the States would practice the constitutional declaration, that "The
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States [article IV]," and enforce it, as meaning that the citizen has
"The right of protection... of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property ...." [the bill would be unnecessary].' 51
In short, Wilson (mistakenly) pointed out that Kent's absolute rights were
already protected against the states by the fifth amendment's due process
clause, 152 and he stuck closely to the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill.
Curtis would deduce from mention of one provision of the Bill of Rights,
which was explicitly embodied in the fourteenth amendment, an intention to
incorporate the entire Bill of Rights. 53 That was not how Bingham was under-
stood by his fellow radicals. William Higby of California thought the article IV
clause and the fifth amendment due process clause constituted "precisely
what will be provided" by the Bingham amendment. 154 Another radical,
Frederick Woodbridge of Vermont, stated: "It is intended to enable Congress
by its enactments when necessary to give a citizen of the United
States ... those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him under
the Constitution [article IV] ... that protection to his property which is ex-
tended [by the due process clause]." ' 5 Then, too, the Joint Committee's
rejection of Bingham's proposal to add the fifth amendment phrase "nor take
private property for public use without just compensation"' 56 alone is incom-
patible with blanket adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Among Curtis' pell-mell citations is William Lawrence's interpretation of
the article IV "privileges and immunities" to protect "certain 'absolute rights
which pertain to every citizen . . . "' citing "the Bill of Rights due process
guarantee as an example of such rights." '57 Lawrence spoke to the Civil
Rights Bill and paraphrased its provisions: the right to contract, to sue, and to
own property. And like Wilson, he followed Kent in defining "absolute
rights" as "[t]he right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to
151. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1117 (1866)(emphasis added).
152. Again and again Wilson emphasized that "[tihe citizen is entitled to life, liberty and the right to
property"; he rebuked Bingham for insisting that "in the protection of these rights the citizen must depend upon
the 'honest purpose of the several States,' and that the General Government cannot interpose its strong right
arm to defend the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and in the possession of property." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866). He rejected Bingham's insistence that the "civil rights [of the bill] involve all
the rights that citizens have under the government," that the bill "invades the States to enforce equality of rights
in respect to those things which properly and rightfully depend upon State regulation and laws." Id. (emphasis
added).
Curtis asserts that "Wilson's remarks, however, merely show that he thought Congress already had power
under article IV, section 2 and the Bill of Rights to pass the Civil Rights Bill." Curtis, supra note 4, at 92. His
supporting citations in note 365 are to remarks of Bingham, not Wilson. Nor does the issue of power expand the
content of the Civil Rights Act, which Wilson so carefully defined.
153. Howard Jay Graham noted no one even pretended that all the clauses and guarantees of the Bill of
Rights ever could or would be enforced against the states. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 314-15
n.80 (1%8).
154. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1054 (1866).
155. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
156. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (1955).
157. Curtis, supra note 4, at 79.
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acquire and enjoy property" 58 --Curtis never pauses to inquire how his
speaker defined his terms. Then Lawrence directed attention to the due proc-
ess provision of the Bill of Rights, and emphasized that the right to live is
empty without the right to contract for the rewards of liberty. 59 The rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill, he said, were the "necessary incidents of
these absolute rights."'60 In his allusion to the privileges and immunities of
article IV, Lawrence acknowledged that "the courts have by construction
limited the words 'all privileges' to mean only 'some privileges,"' noting
further that they were "confined to those privileges and immunities which are
in their nature fundamental .... the right of protection of life and liberty,
and to acquire and possess property," i.e., the "absolute rights." 6' And he
said, "conceding, as the courts have held, that the privileges referred to in the
Constitution are such as are fundamental civil rights, not political rights, nor
those dependent on local law," they should be enjoyed by all citizens. 62 The
"fundamental rights" to which Lawrence referred were the "absolute rights"
he had earlier enumerated. That a broader construction of "civil rights" was
far from Lawrence's mind is further confirmed by his mention of the deletion
from the Civil Rights Bill of the "civil rights and immunities" clause in
deference to Bingham's objection that "the constitutions of the States are to
be abolished by your act," 63 the effect of which was unmistakably to restrict
the Act to the several enumerated categories.
Curtis' appeal to Martin Thayer is of the same order: "For Thayer one
principle of the Civil Rights Bill was the power of Congress to enforce the Bill
of Rights in the states," quoting Thayer's statement that the fourteenth
amendment "simply brings into the Constitution what is found in the bill of
rights of every State .... [I]t is but incorporating in the Constitution ... the
principle of the Civil Rights Bill."' 64 By his own testimony, the bill does not
incorporate the Bill of Rights. He dispensed in his short paragraph with reca-
pitulating his earlier detailed remarks,' 65 and these, like those of Wilson and
Lawrence, disclose the narrow scope of his allusion to the Bill of Rights.
There Thayer stated that the "sole purpose of the bill is to secure ... the
158. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1833 (1866).
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 1835-36 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1836. So it was understood by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Justice Bradley declared that the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 undertook to secure
those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue. be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase ... property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... [C]ongress did not assume ... to adjust what may be called the social
rights of men.., but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights ....
Id. at 22. And in response to the question whether "admission to an inn, a public conveyance, a place of public
amusement" is "one of those rights which the states by the Fourteenth Amendment are forbidden to deny to
any person," the Court held that "no countenance of authority" for the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
purported to convey such rights, "can be found in ... the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution ......
Id. at 24, 25.
163. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1836-37 (1866).
164. Curtis, supra note 4, at 82-83.
165. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866).
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fundamental rights of citizenship .... those rights which secure life, liberty,
and property." He scoffed at a "freedom" under which a man was deprived
of the right of "going from one place to another," the right "to contract," to
"sell or convey real or personal estate." He would have "power to pass laws
which will guaranty and insure those great rights and immunities. "'66 It was
Thayer who stressed that "in order to avoid any misapprehension they [the
fundamental rights of citizenship] are stated in the bill. The same section goes
on to define with greater particularity the civil rights and immunities which
are to be protected by the bill," reading them into the record. And, he added,
"that enumeration precludes any possibility that the general words which
have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which have been
enumerated." 67 When ten weeks later Thayer spoke in the compass of a short
paragraph and referred to his earlier testmony, he could rely on his carefully
articulated explanation to limit the generality of his brief allusion. Curtis'
reliance on Wilson-Lawrence-Thayer for incorporation of the Bill of Rights
reveals how ill-digested is his analysis.
E. Senator Jacob Howard
Senator Howard is, with Bingham, one of the pillars of Curtis' case, as he
was of Justice Black's; he considered that to the privileges and immunities of
article IV "should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the
first eight amendments." 69 Due to the sudden illness of Chairman Fessenden,
it fell to Howard to act as spokesman for the Joint Committee. Up to this point
his participation in the debates on the Civil Rights Bill and the several aspects
of the amendment had been negligible.
166. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 1151. Thayer's summation that freedmen are as citizens "entitled to... the guarantee of the
Constitution which secures to every citizen the enjoyment of life, liberty and property" is juxtaposed by Curtis
with Michael Kerr's (a Democrat) statement that Thayer "informs us that in effect the first eleven amendments
are grants of power to Congress, and that they contain guarantees which it is the right and duty of Congress to
secure and enforce in the States." Curtis asserts that "Thayer accepted the characterization as correct." Curtis.
supra note 4, at 79. First, Kerr refused to yield unless he had "misstated" Thayer's position, and Thayer,
anxious to ask of "what value [Kerr] supposed such a guarantee is, if, as he contends, there is no power to
maintain it," answered equivocally, "I do not know that the gentleman has misstated my position." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1866). Curtis would regard this as a repudiation by Thayer of his carefully
delineated position, rather than an attempt to pacify Kerr. Second, I found no reference by Thayer to the "first
eleven amendments," so Kerr was putting words into Thayer's mouth. Third, the eleventh amendment is no
part of the Bill of Rights, so the argument proves too much.
168. Despite the foregoing restrictive Wilson-Lawrence-Thayer statements, Curtis cites them for the
proposition that
supporters of the Civil Rights Bill appealed to ... the power to protect fundamental rights of Ameri-
can citizens under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, and what was for a
number of Republicans essentially the same, the power to enforce the guarantees set out in the Bill of
Rights.
Curtis, supra note 4, at 76 (emphasis added). So too, he prefers to their specifics the generalities of Senator
Yates, "[T]heir rights shall not be abridged by any State," and Senator Hendersons' statement that the § I
provisions "merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all free governments." Id. at 96 (emphasis
added). These "rights" had been spelled out by Wilson, Lawrence, Thayer, and Trumbull.
169. Curtis, supra note 4, at 94.
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Howard, according to [Benjamin) Kendrick, "was one of the most... reckless of
radicals" who had "served consistently in the vanguard of the extreme Negro-
philes."... [Hie and Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois "had been the only Republi-
cans to hold out for black suffrage to the end, all the others proved willing to
abandon it." That such a man could speak "for" a Committee in which the
"non-radicals clearly outnumbered the radicals," in which, by the testimony of
the co-chairmen Fessenden and Stevens, there "was very considerable difference
of opinion," needs to be taken, in the words of the"immortal" Samuel Goldwyn,
with a "bushel of salts."
70
No one rose to criticize Howard's inclusion, in the course of a long speech, of
the Bill of Rights in the privileges or immunities clause, but a Senate which
had been categorically assured by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
Trumbull, of its limited scope, and was probably aware of similar explana-
tions in the House, presumably felt no need to contradict Howard. But after
Howard spoke, Senator Poland observed about the privileges or immunities
clause that it "secures nothing beyond what was intended by the original
[article IV] provision in the Constitution," 7' which antedated and, therefore,
could not comprehend the Bill of Rights. Senator Fessenden, who was the
Chairman of the Joint Committee, declared that "[tlhe real and only object"
of section 1 "is to make negroes citizens, to prop the civil rights bill, and give
them a more plausible, if not a valid, claim to its provisions." And he added,
the "privileges or immunities" clause "is unnecessary, because that matter is
provided for in article four .... This provision comprehends the same
principle . ,, 172
He echoed similar explanations in the House only two weeks before
Howard spoke. James Garfield stated that the amendment proposed to put the
Civil Rights Bill "beyond the reach of the plots and machinations of any
party."' 73 Thayer considered "it is but incorporating in the Constitution of
the United States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a
law" in order that it "shall be forever incorporated in the Constitution of the
United States."'74 John Broomall of Pennsylvania remarked, "It may be
170. To avoid cluttering citations, I quote from R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 147 (1977).
Curtis renders this passage as "[wle are told that Howard was a 'reckless... radical, a Negrophile' who held
out for *black suffrage' to the end .... As the violence of Berger's attack suggests, Howard's remarks are very
damaging to his thesis." Fairness required disclosure that the quoted remarks were those of respected scholars,
not my "violent" reaction.
"Howard apparently had not entered into the spirit of Bingham's drafting: three times in the committee he
had voted against the author's work. Howard would have had the Section declare simply, no discrimination by
State or federal government as to civil rights on account of color." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1291 (1971).
171. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2961 (1866)(emphasis added). To counter this statement Curtis
grasps at straws: "Poland's remarks suggest a difference between the intent of the provision and the construc-
tion it had received." Curtis, supra note 4, at 88. Poland's colleagues, we may be sure, saw no such fine spun
distinctions. For them "intent" could be drawn from the legislative history, as Charles Sumner stated in the
very same debates, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 677 (1866), and judicial construction sought for that
"intent." Certainly the framers' discussion of the article IV clause identified the judicial construction with the
rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act.
172. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., S. App. 240 (1866)(emphasis added).
173. Id. at 2462.
174. Id. at 2465 (emphasis added).
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asked, why should we put a provision in the Constitution which is already
contained in an act of Congress?" Because of the constitutional doubts ex-
pressed by Bingham, Broomall "wish[ed] to make assurance doubly sure"
and "to prevent a mere majority from repealing the law."' 75 Tracing the
development of bill and amendment, Henry Raymond of New York stated
that by the bill "Congress proposed to exercise precisely the powers which
that amendment was intended to confer." Now that the bill "became a law,"
he continued, "it is again proposed so to amend the Constitution as to confer
upon Congress the power to pass it." 176 Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts
referred to the doubts as to Congress' power to enact the Civil Rights Act, and
voted for the amendment to "settle the doubt which some gentlemen entertain
upon that question." 177 And after Howard's remarks, George Latham said in
the House that "the 'civil rights bill,' which is now a law ... , covers exactly
the same ground as this amendment." 178 Such statements were designed to
allay fear of undue encroachment of state powers. But for the remarks of
Howard and Bingham, no one, so far as my reading goes, declared that the
amendment went beyond the rights embodied in the Civil Rights Act. And the
reason, earlier stated by Hale, was that "there are other liberties as important
as the liberties of the individual citizen, and those are the liberties and rights
of the States." 179
Senator Poland observed that "[g]reat differences have existed among
ourselves; many opinions have had to yield to enable us to agree upon a
plan." 180 There are similar expressions by Fessenden and Stevens., s Now
Curtis asks us to infer, after the compromise of such differences about known
and debated objectives, that there was unquestioning acceptance of even
more sweeping state concessions, which had received no consideration what-
ever! The reservation to the states by the tenth amendment of "powers not
delegated to the United States" is not to be curtailed by "vague" words. So
sweeping a state surrender of local administration to federal control as
Howard's remarks contemplate is not, to borrow from Justice Miller, to be
embraced "in the absence of language which expressed such a purpose too
clearly to admit of doubt," 182 the less because of a broad consensus that the
amendment and Civil Rights Act were "identical," "precisely," "exactly"
the same.
175. Id. at 2498 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 2502 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 2511. "'To remove any doubt was one of the reasons the fourteenth amendment was passed."
Curtis, supra note 4, at 92. The other was to prevent repeal of the Civil Rights Act. See note 46 supra.
178. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866)(emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1065. See Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN
RECONSTRUCTION 40 (H. Hyman ed. 1966) (quoted in note 147 supra). For the framers' attachment to state
sovereignty, see R- BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 60-64 (1977).
180. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2964 (1866).
181. Id. at 2332, 2459, 3148.
182. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Vall.) 36, 78 (1872). See note 110 supra.
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F. "Miscitations"
Like a hen which scratches and scratches and at length finds a grain of
corn, Curtis at last finds several "miscitations" in Berger, which he dramati-
cally unfolds as if to prove a malevolent design to deceive:
8 3
Howard explicitly ran "down the list of the federal Bill of Rights," performing an
operation which Berger, quoting Fairman, assures us never happens in debate.
Berger says that "no newspaper reported Howard's remarkable expansion of
the privileges and immunities clause .... ." In fact, Howard's speech was re-
ported in detail on the front page of the New York Times of May 24, 1866, and
elsewhere. 184
Passing for the moment my own derelictions, these "miscitations" merely
constitute cumulative evidence, and their subtraction in no way affects the
evidence that the framers had a restrictive view of the "privileges or immuni-
ties" clause. I might plead in extenuation that I relied on Harry Flack, who,
Justice Black stated, searched the newspapers quite thoroughly," 5 and said
"the general opinion held in the North... was that the Amendment em-
bodied the Civil Rights Bill .... There does not seem to have been any
statement at all as to whether the first eight Amendments were to be made
applicable to the States or not. . . ." 86 Or, I might plead that to find two or
three "miscitations" in a mass of several thousand citations adds up to a very
slight margin of error. But no; scholarly integrity demands exactitude in every
detail, and I therefore freely confess error, for no scholar worthy of the name
would delude his fellows by mistaken testimony. Would that activists would
as freely confess their errors.
Another charge of miscitation needs to be noticed:
In a final suggestion which would emasculate the fourteenth amendment,
Professor Berger tells us that the amendment was to be enforced by Congress
only, not by the courts. "Why," Berger asks us, "did Hotchkiss protest that
section 5 'proposes to leave it to the caprice of Congress' whether or not to
enforce antidiscrimination, if it was assumed that the courts could act in the face of
congressional inaction?"
Hotchkiss did not make his protest about section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment .... At that time no section 5 was before the House or even existed.
Instead, the remark quoted by Berger occurred in the debate of Bingham's proto-
type of the fourteenth amendment-the one which gave Congress the power to
secure privileges and immunities.187
My reference to section 5 was mistaken, but on the merits the mistake is
inconsequential, for the "prototype" contains a parallel provision, and
equally serves to make the point. In both cases, power was granted to Con-
gress, not the courts. The prototype provided: "The Congress shall have
183. Compare Curtis' model, W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953), note 22 supra.
184. Curtis, supra note 4, at 96.
185. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 109 (1947)(Black, J., dissenting).
186. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 153 (1908).
187. Curtis, supra note 4, at 99-100.
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power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure ... all
privileges and immunities .... " 8 Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this arti-
cle." The latter was restricted to enforcement of "the provisions" of the
amendment; the former conferred a general power to make law in the premi-
ses. But in both cases, the "shall have power" phraseology left it in the
discretion of Congress to act. Curtis notices that the "final version of the
fourteenth amendment broke the subject into two parts with explicit restric-
tion on the states.., and with congressional power to enforce in section
5."89 All this does not undermine my question, "Why... did Hotchkiss
protest that [the prototype of] section 5 'proposes to leave it to the caprice of
Congress' whether or not to enforce antidiscrimination, if it was assumed that
the courts could act in the face of congressional inaction?" What else did
Hotchkiss, to quote Curtis, mean other than "that Bingham's prototype was
not self-executing and would depend on a majority of Congress." To deduce
that "Hotchkiss' speech together with the change in form of the amendment
to meet his objection, prove the opposite of Berger's contention-that the
amendment was to be enforced by the courts as well as by Congress"' 9 is to
insist that 2 plus 2 equals 5.19'
Of course I did not rely solely on Hotchkiss; his statement was but one
piece in the mosaic. First, "Berger tells us" might more honestly have been
framed as "The Supreme Court told us" 192 in 1879:
It is not said that the judicial power of the general government shall extend to
enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed.
It is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void any
action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which
has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibition by appropri-
ate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully
effective. 193
There is no need to recapitulate the materials set forth in my book which
illuminate and confirm this statement. 194 Here let it suffice to say that in 1872,
188. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1088 (1866).
189. Curtis, supra note 4, at 100.
190. Id.
191. Hotchkiss was opposed to giving Congress power to legislate in the premises rather than to correct
discrimination. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
192. Curtis employs this shoddy technique throughout: "according to Berger," see text accompanying
note 100 supra, "Berger argues," text accompanying note 97 supra; see also notes 51 & 170 supra, cloaking
that I generally quote authorities or that my views are widely shared. It is open to him to prefer the authority of
"Justice Black and Professor Crosskey," Curtis, supra note 4, at 101, but it is a disservice to scholarship to
leave unmentioned that those views are not shared by the scholarly community and were rejected by the
Supreme Court, not merely by Berger.
193. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)(emphasis added).
194. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 221-29 (1977). For example, Senator Howard stated that
§ 5 constitutes
a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles of these guarantees, a
power not found in the Constitution. It ... casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for
the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State
infringes the rights of persons and property.... I look at this clause as indispensable for the reason
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Senator Oliver Morton, a member of the 39th Congress who also participated
in framing the fifteenth amendment, adverted to the "great fact" that "the
remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments [section 2
of the fifteenth employed the terms of section 5 of the fourteenth] was ex-
pressly not left to the courts. The remedy was legislative, because in each the
amendment itself provided that it shall be enforced by legislation on the part
of Congress." 1
95
G. Curtis' "Bombshell"
It would be tedious and unprofitable to dwell on still other Curtis argu-
ments; throughout he is carried away by "glittering generalities" such as were
contemptuously dismissed by James Wilson;'9 6 throughout he resorts to cheap
devices of advocacy that are incompatible with scholarly research, seeking to
diminish my credibility by half-truths and distortions.' 97 Instead, let me close
with Curtis' bombshell, Bingham's explanation in 1871 of why he "had
changed the form of the amendment of February 1866": when he reread the
Barron v. Baltimore holding that the Bill of Rights applied solely to the federal
government, not to the states, he determined to correct that deficiency, stat-
ing that "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States ... are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments . ,,.g.98 And, he continued,
"These eight articles ... never were limitations upon the powers of the
States, until made so by the fourteenth amendment."' 99 I had anticipated
Curtis' discovery of, and defused, this statement in 1979. 200 But first let us
compare these remarks with Bingham's 1866 statements in which he did not
refer to the "first eight amendments."
Nowhere does Curtis sift the conflicting Bingham statements to support
his statement that "Bingham merely proposed to arm Congress with power to
enforce provisions of the Bill of Rights which in Bingham's view the states
were already obligated to obey by the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2. " 2' At the risk of tedium it is necessary to collate and
compare Bingham's utterances, for his references to the Bill of Rights Were
almost always in the context of life, liberty, and property and were so under-
that it thus imposes upon Congress this power and this duty. It enables Congress, in case the States
shall enact laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal
congressional amendment [i.e. statute].
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 2768 (1886). Senator Luke "Poland, like the rest, contemplated
action by Congress and ignored direct enforcement by the courts." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1296 (1971).
During a visit in April, 1868, to South Carolina, Justice David Davis, an Illinoisan, wrote, "There is more
repugnancy to negroes at the west than here-repugnancy I mean to any and every idea of equality." Id. at 482.
195. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872). For similar remarks see Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 311, 351, 352 (1979).
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1294 (1866).
197. See note 192 supra and note 217 infra.
198. Curtis, supra note 4, at 84-85.
199. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., App. 84 (1871).
200. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311 ,345-47 (1979).
201. Curtis, supra note 4, at 67.
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stood by his fellows. In introducing his draft, he said that except for the
enforcement provision, "[t]he residue" is in "the language of the second
section of the fourth article, and of a portion of the fifth amendment," refer-
ring to his equal protection of life, liberty, and property.2 2 If, however, privi-
leges and immunities comprehended the entire Bill of Rights, his express due
process-life, liberty, and property-provision was superfluous. True,
Bingham stated that "this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitu-
tion, rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the
States.-203 But Bingham's subsequent references repeatedly were to "pro-
tection of life, liberty, and property," asking after one such reference, for
example, "Is the bill of rights to stand.., a mere dead letter?' 204 Every free
citizen, he stressed, may not be limited "in the rights of life, liberty, and
property. Gentlemen who oppose this amendment oppose the grant of power
to enforce the bill of rights., 205 Pressed by Hale, however, he declared that it
was "the equal protection clause that provided" that state protection "shall
be equal in respect to life, liberty, and property to all persons.''-16 Later he
departed from the "equal protection" provision to speak of "the bill of rights,
touching the life, liberty, and property of every citizen., 20 7 In the same
speech he stated, "the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the
citizen ... is in the States .... I have advocated here an amendment which
would arm Congress with the power to ... punish all violations by State
officers of the bill of rights., 28 Another "life, property" reference was to the
slave states' "disregard for the bill of rights as to slaves [some abolitionists
considered that "slavery violated the fifth amendrrfent"], refusing them pro-
tection in life or property. ' ' 209 He maintained that no state "has any right to
deny protection to any free citizen ... in the rights of life, liberty and prop-
erty. Gentlemen who oppose this amendment oppose the grant of power to
enforce the bill of rights." 2'0 In his final remarks he said that privileges and
immunities "include, among other privileges, the right to bear true allegiance
to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to be protected in life,
liberty and property, ' 211 the subject of his equal protection clause.
202. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1034 (1866). After reading the due process clause of the fifth
amendment as the source of his own proposed amendment, Bingham stated, "'the proposed amendment does
not impose upon any State... any obligation which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the
Constitution." Id.
203. Id. See Curtis, supra note 4, at 68.
204. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1090 (1866).
205. Id. See also id. at 1093.
206. Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 1291.
208. Id. at 1292.
209. Id. at 1090. See Curtis, supra note 4, at 55.
210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1090 (1866).
211. Id. at 2542. Bingham's fleeting reference to the infliction of"cruel and unusual punishments," Curtis,
supra note 4, at 91, cannot overcome his repeated emphasis on life, liberty, and property, particularly because.
as Stevens explained, the amendment, like the Civil Rights Bill, provided that "[w]hatever law punishes awhite
man for a crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
2459 (1866). The framer's aim was to preclude discrimination, not to embody the "cruel and unusual" clause.
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The words "life, liberty, and property," as we have seen, were code
words for personal security, personal freedom, and the right to own prop-
erty.232 Bingham's repeated association of these words with the Bill of Rights
would lead his fellows to believe that his goals did not go beyond theirs,
namely, the protection accorded life, liberty, and property by the rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. Curtis explains that "Bingham and other
framers [besides Howard, who were the "others"] of the fourteenth amend-
ment" read the article IV privileges and immunities as "including those in the
Bill of Rights. This reading may well have been incorrect." 2 t3 As Curtis
recognizes, it was "a radically unorthodox reading of the original Constitu-
tion. ' 214 Consequently, it was incumbent on Bingham to explain his "radi-
cally unorthodox" purpose,2 '5 as he later did in 1871, in words which ex-
plained it "too clearly to admit of doubt. ' 2 6 So far as I could find, Bingham
never alluded in the 1866 debates to the first eight amendments.2 17 And as I
showed in 1979, Bingham's 1871 view plainly was not shared by his fellows,
Fairman refers to "the disconcerting way in which Bingham would pluck a constitutional phrase and toss it in at
some point to which it had no relevance." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT OFTHE UNITED
STATES 1289 (1971).
212. See text accompanying notes 151, 157-60, and 166-67 supra. Curtis writes that "[b]y 1866 the doctrine
that the states could not restrict the fundamental liberties of American citizens had been accepted by many
Republicans." Curtis, supra note 4, at 51. But he fails to notice the framers' limited catalog of the liberties they
intended to protect.
213. Curtis, supra note 4. at 86.
214. Id. at 92. Curtis dismisses the view that "Bingham's references to the Bill of Rights touching life,
liberty and property were understood by his fellow congressmen in the technical sense of referring to the rights
secured by the Civil Rights Bill." commenting, "Before and after in American history, the Bill of Rights referred
to the first eight or ten amendments to the Constitution. On this occasion, however, according to Berger [and
Fairman]. the phrase has a specialized meaning, never given to it before or since." Id. at 68. Contra, the
testimony of Wilson, Lawrence and Thayer. See text accompanying notes 151, 157-60, and 166-67 supra.
215. Even Bingham's activist apologists read him restrictively. Graham observes that "no one even pre-
tended that all the clauses and guarantees of the Bill or Rights ever could or would be enforced against the
States." He concluded that the "odds appear heavily against" imputing to Bingham an intention to include
".every clause of each of the eight amendments." H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION, 265, 315 n.80
(1968).
216. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
217. Curtis refers to "Berger's edited version of what Bingham had to say.., with liberal assistance from
ellipsis dots." Curtis, supra note 4, at 89-90. The materials "edited" and replaced by "ellipsis" were innocuous
and in no way vitiate my statement that "reservation of protection to the states is 'incompatible with state
"violation" of the Bill of Rights."' Id. at 90. His example, with the omitted portions in brackets, follows:
[t]he care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, [under the solemn sanction of an oath
imposed by your Federal Constitution], is in the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have
sought to effect no change in that respect [in the Constitution of the country]. I have advocated here an
amendment which [would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath, and] punish
all violations by State officers of the bill of rights [but leaving those officers to discharge the duties
enjoined upon' them as citizens of the United States by the oath and by that Constitution].
Id. Curtis betrays his careless reading and recklessness by his charge that thus I "edited" and omitted in order
to make a case.
He also finds it "curious" that Berger "separates his discussion of privileges and immunities from his
discussion of incorporation of the Bill of Rights," id. at 86, stating,
Berger tells us that Senator Howard also referred to article IV, section 2 in discussing privileges and
immunities. What he does not tell us for another one hundred and ten pages is that Howard... said
explicitly that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States protected by the fourteenth
amendment included those rights set out in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.
Id. at 87-88. Curtis gives this "separation" a sinister cast, little recking that one might innocently conclude to
treat the 1866 debates on "privileges or immunities" in one chapter, and reserve Black's 1947 incorporation
doctrine for a separate chapter, just as I did with § 5, with suffrage, and with segregation.
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among whom sat a considerable number of framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment. A couple of months earlier he himself had submitted a Report of the
Committee of the Judiciary, stating:
The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States," does not in the opinion of the committee, refer to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States other than privileges and immunities
embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article IV, section 2. The four-
teenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities
before mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement as an express
limitation upon the powers of the States. 218
James Garfield, before long to be elected to the presidency, emphasized in
1871 that he "not only heard the whole [1866] debate at the time, but I have
lately read over, with scrupulous care, every word of it as recorded in the
Globe," read copiously therefrom into the record, and stated:
In the long debate which followed, this section [1] of the amendment was con-
sidered as equivalent to the first section of the civil rights bill, except that a new
power was added [equal protection clause] .... It was throughout the debate,
with scarcely an exception, spoken of as a limitation of the power of the States to
legislate unequally for the protection of life and property.
Senator Trumbull, as we have seen, took an equally restricted view of section
1.220
The clincher is furnished by an amendment proposed by James Blaine in
1875, in a Congress which included twenty-three members of the 39th Con-
gress, among them Blaine. Prior thereto he had written a letter published by
the New York Times indicating that the fourteenth amendment did not forbid
States from establishing official churches or maintaining sectarian schools.
Consequently he proposed that "[n]o State shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Not one of the several Representatives and Senators who spoke on the proposal
even suggested that its provisions were implicit in the amendment ratified just
seven years earlier .... Remarks of Randolph, Christiancy, Keman, Whyte,
Bogy, Eaton and Morton give confirmation to the belief that none of the legislators
in 1875 thought the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the religious provisions
of the First.7
218. H.R. REP. NO. 22, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1871), reprinted in A. AvINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS DEBATES 466 (1967).
219. CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess., App. 151 (1871). In the same session, Charles Willard said of§ I
of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866: "This section, it should be remembered, was enacted by the same Congress
which recommended the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and is, therefore, the best possible statement of
what that amendment was intended to secure." Id. at App. 189. For similar expressions by Justices Bradley and
Field, see text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
220. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
221. F. O'BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116 (1958), quoted in J. MCCLELLAN,
JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 154 (1971). See also Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, 64 HARv. L. REV. 939 (1951).
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The companion free speech discovery was first made by the Court in 1925,222
just three years after it had held that the free speech provision did not govern
the states.223 It is sheer wishful thinking in light of these facts to cling to the
Bingham-Howard remarks on which Justice Black relied.
IV. CONCLUSION
A generation grown accustomed to judicial rape of federalism needs to be
reminded that "inscrutable" words 224 cannot constitute a waiver of power
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Because such a surrender was
not expressed in the Bill of Rights in "plain and intelligible language," it was
rejected by Chief Justice Marshall. 22 No such aim could be attributed to the
framers of the fourteenth amendment, Justice Miller later held in the
Slaughter-House Cases, in the absence of "language which expresses such a
purpose too clearly to admit of doubt. 226 The "commitment" to federalism,
a leading activist, Alfred Kelly, finally admitted, "meant that the radical
Negro reform program could be only a very limited one.- 227 Much less was
the North prepared to surrender control over its own internal administration
in matters having nothing whatever to do with safeguarding the "fundamental
rights" of Negroes.
The history of the pivotal "privileges or immunities" clause abundantly
demonstrates that it responded to the framers' desire to shield blacks from
violence and oppression, to secure to them the "fundamental rights" to life,
to personal liberty, and to own property by furnishing the "incidents" that
safeguarded those rights-namely, the right to contract, to own property, and
to have access to the courts, no more. Suffrage, the right of rights, without
222. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
223. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922). See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-
ARY 270-71 (1977).
224. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
225. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
226. See text accompanying note 35 supra. In the 39th Congress, Samuel Shellabarger emphasized that did
the Civil Rights Bill assume to confer the rights therein enumerated, "then it would be... an assumption of the
reserved rights of the States and the people." But, he reassured the House, it merely insured that such of the
enumerated rights as the states conferred could not be restricted on the basis of color. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1293 (1866). Similarly, Senator Trumbull declared that 'if the State of Kentucky makes no
discrimination in civil rights between its citizens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Kentucky."
Id. at 600. And he reiterated that it "in no manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which
protects all alike in their rights of person and property." Id. at 1761 (emphasis added). For similar remarks by
William Lawrence, see note 143 supra. It is constantly to be borne in mind that the framers regarded the Civil
Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment as "identical." See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra. With
respect to the antecedent privileges and immunities of article IV, Justice Miller stated, "Its sole purpose was to
declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citi-
zens . . . the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within
your jurisdiction." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872). Fairman comments, "Since Article
IV promised the visiting citizen nothing more than potluck, it was faulty reasoning to say that as a consequence
of that provision one reached the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed adequate substantive
fare to every citizen of the United States in his own or in any other State." 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1358 (1971) (emphasis added).
227. See note 147 supra. Repeatedly the framers rejected attempts to prohibit all discriminations. R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 163-64 (1977). See also text accompanying note 87 supra.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
which, Charles Sumner maintained, the fourteenth amendment "was in-
adequate to protect them in anything,"228 incontrovertibly was excluded.
Those who, like Curtis, insist upon judicial enforcement of the Bill of
Rights against the states premise that the results are so laudable that they
must perforce be constitutional. In his autobiography, Justice Douglas re-
counts Chief Justice Hughes' advice that "90% of any [constitutional] deci-
sion is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reason for supporting
our predilections." Then and there Douglas admitted to himself that "the
'gut' reactions of a judge at the level of constitutional adjudication, dealing
with the vagaries [?] of due process, freedom of speech and the like, was the
main ingredient of his decision., 2 9 Why should millions of Americans prefer
the "gut" reaction of the Justices against death penalties, for instance, to
their own belief that death penalties are a deterrent to crime, as current
legislation in some 35 states attests? 20 The judicial "gut" reaction, under
democratic principles, is no substitute for the will of the people.
It is because activist theorists increasingly realize that resort to "law-
yers' history" will no longer serve, 3' that Professor Paul Brest challenges the
assumption that judges "are bound by the Constitution." - 2 2 Such candor is
vastly preferable to Curtis' rationalizations after the fact, sheer wishful think-
ing, for it brings the real issue, judicial usurpation, out into the open, so that
the people can decide for themselves whether they prefer to rule their own
destiny.
228. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1008 (1869).
229. New York Times, September 21, 1980, § 6 (Magazine) at 40 (emphasis added). But when garbed in
judicial robes, Justice Douglas declared, "Our individual preferences, however, are not the constitutional
standard." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). Law in books and law in action!
Professor Charles Black, warning against damaging judicial appointments if Ronald Reagan is elected
President, writes, "The question is whether one wants a Supreme Court... dominated by people (whether or
not they made good grades in law school) whose sense of social justice approximates that of the most reaction-
ary justices now on the bench." New York Times, October 16, 1980, at A-30. Thus, he too makes judicial
"predilections" the test of constitutionality, because prevailing predilections reflect his own. The election of
Reagan may persuade him that the people prefer his predilections to those of Black. Chief Judge Cardozo wrote
that "the substitution in every instance of the individual sense of justice ... would put an end to the reign of
law." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 (1921). Justice Jackson, in a concurring
opinion, stated that
the belief is widely held by the practicing profession that this Court no longer respects impersonal rules
of law but is guided in these matters by personal impressions which from time to time may be shared by
a majority of the Justices .... [Tihis Court also has generated an impression in much of the judici-
ary ... that words no longer mean what they have always meant to the profession, that the law knows
no fixed principles.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 535 (1953). And he sagely commented, "I know of no way we can have equal
justice under law except we have some law." Id. at 546.
230. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 261 n.52 (1977).
231. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Perry, Book Review, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 685, 688 (1978): "Berger effectively destroys.., the notion that modem constitutional cases
involving legislative reapportionment, school desegregation, criminal procedure, or first amendment issues, are
somehow rooted (however tenuously) in the original understanding-or even the 'spirit' of the fourteenth
amendment."
232. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 224 (1980). See
also Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212, 1215 (1977).
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